Opinion

The rails we lost: How South Africa squandered its continental mandate for rolling stock

Nomvula Zeldah Mabuza|Published

South Africa has neither built a sustainable rolling-stock industry nor maintained a reliable domestic rail system, says the author.

Image: Wesley Ford

 In 2015, the African Union (AU) assigned South Africa the continental mandate to lead the manufacturing of rolling stock for Africa. The decision recognised South Africa’s industrial base, engineering expertise and infrastructure as the continent’s most advanced. It was an opportunity to anchor regional industrialisation, create skilled employment and supply trains, coaches and components to a growing African market.

As Professor Pali Lehohla observed, “The 2015 AU Summit granted South Africa rights to rolling stock, but ten years later nothing happened, except that we ripped our rail apart, disgustingly throwing confidence in our ability to supply rolling stock to the continent completely out of the window, along with any hope for steel manufacturing.”

Ten years later, that assessment stands uncomfortably close to the truth. South Africa has neither built a sustainable rolling-stock industry nor maintained a reliable domestic rail system. The failure to implement the AU’s mandate reflects a broader pattern of policy inertia and institutional decline that continues to undermine competitiveness and credibility.

Between 2017 and 2025, Transnet Freight Rail’s performance reveals the scale of regression. In 2017/18, TFR moved about 226 million tonnes of freight. By 2023/24, volumes had fallen to 151.7 million tonnes and projections for 2024/25 stand between 160 million and 165 million tonnes, well below the 170 million-tonne target. This contraction illustrates not only operational underperformance but also the erosion of industrial capacity and export reliability.

Passenger rail has suffered equally. Prasa’s modernisation programme, designed to deliver over 600 train sets, has produced fewer than 120 usable units since 2015. Many have been vandalised or remain idle because of power failures and infrastructure decay. The Gibela plant in Nigel, established to revive local manufacturing, operates far below its design output. Localisation targets of 65 % content were announced without matching investment in supplier readiness, testing, or certification.

Transnet Engineering retains technical competence, but utilisation of its factories fluctuates between 40 % and 60 %, a direct result of irregular procurement and inconsistent funding. Workshops that once exported locomotives and wagons now depend on maintenance contracts to survive. Skills loss has become chronic; the number of apprentices in rail-related trades continues to fall while qualified engineers leave the sector.

The AU’s 2015 decision demanded long-term coordination across the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, Transnet, Prasa and the private sector. Instead, implementation was fragmented by institutional turnover, procurement redesigns and leadership instability. Policy continuity collapsed under frequent board changes and industrial objectives became political slogans rather than deliverables.

Energy insecurity has amplified these failures. Load-shedding and copper theft repeatedly interrupt production schedules and increase manufacturing costs by up to 25 %. Security failures along main lines have undermined freight reliability and destroyed investor confidence. These are not incidental disruptions; they are symptoms of systemic neglect.

The economic consequences are measurable. Rail and port inefficiencies now cost South Africa an estimated 4 % to 5 % of GDP each year. Mining, agriculture and manufacturing, all dependent on predictable transport, have absorbed the losses through higher logistics costs and missed export opportunities. The cumulative effect is a drag on growth and a weakening of South Africa’s industrial standing.

Regionally, South Africa’s failure to execute has created a vacuum that others have filled. Countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya and Ethiopia now procure locomotives, carriages and maintenance services from China, India and Spain. These contracts could have supported South African employment, supplier development and technology transfer. Instead, they represent the continent’s quiet reorientation away from South Africa as its preferred manufacturing base.

Comparable economies show what could have been achieved. Morocco has built strong partnerships with global manufacturers and now exports rolling stock within Africa. Egypt has localised metro and mainline assembly lines while maintaining domestic control of core production. India’s hybrid model, public-sector offtake combined with private investment and long-term contracts, demonstrates how continuity attracts capital even under fiscal pressure. Each of these models is defined by stability, credible schedules and enforceable standards.

South Africa can still recover, but only through disciplined execution. The fundamentals are known and within reach. The government must publish a six-year rolling procurement calendar for locomotives, wagons and passenger units. Manufacturers plan around certainty, not statements. Predictable offtake will allow factories to invest, train staff and build supply chains at scale.

Technical standards must be consolidated. Fragmented design and certification rules increase cost and delay. A unified regional standard across braking, couplers, bogies and signalling will lower trade barriers and align with African Continental Free Trade Area’s (AfCFTA) integration agenda.

Localisation must become incremental and evidence-based. Imposing a 60 % local-content rule without developing the component base has repeatedly failed. A phased roadmap, supported by supplier-development funding and performance-linked incentives, would create sustainable capability rather than compliance paperwork.

Industrial security must be treated as a production input. Copper theft and energy instability require contractual enforcement and measurable uptime. Dedicated microgrids or direct-power agreements for manufacturing sites could reduce disruption. Security and energy reliability are no longer public works issues; they are core determinants of competitiveness.

Financing instruments must also evolve. Blended finance, combining public guarantees, development finance and private capital, can fund infrastructure and tooling if governance is transparent. Institutions such as Development Bank of Southern Africa, Industrial Development Corporation and African Development Bank should structure rail-industry funds tied to delivery milestones. Each disbursement should depend on trains produced, jobs sustained, and local content verified.

The regional opportunity remains large. SADC alone faces an estimated $10 billion demand for rolling stock by 2035. Africa’s broader requirement exceeds $35bn, driven by freight expansion and urban transit projects. Even modest market participation would restore thousands of jobs, attract new investment and re-establish industrial credibility.

The AfCFTA framework reinforces this opportunity. Standardised certification would allow rolling stock manufactured in South Africa to move across borders without costly duplication. The continent’s rules of origin encourage shared production, where South African factories supply components to partner countries for final assembly. This approach aligns with regional development and enhances economic diplomacy through delivery, not rhetoric.

Rebuilding capacity also requires human capital. Technical and vocational colleges must be resourced to produce artisans trained in modern mechanical, electrical and digital systems. Universities can support design and systems engineering while industry provides practical training. A coordinated pipeline of apprenticeships linked to production schedules will ensure skills renewal.

Governance reform is non-negotiable. State-owned-enterprise boards need stable leadership with proven industrial experience. Oversight should prioritise operational results rather than procedural compliance. The frequent rotation of executives has damaged institutional memory and delayed every major rail initiative of the past decade. Continuity and accountability are prerequisites for recovery.

The economic multiplier from rail manufacturing is substantial. Every R1 billion invested in rolling stock can generate hundreds of skilled jobs and significant secondary employment through supplier chains. Domestic component production reduces imports, strengthens the current account and expands the tax base. Reliable rail transport also lowers commuter costs and supports environmental goals by shifting freight from road to rail.

The challenge now is execution. Policy coherence, governance stability and operational discipline, not new strategy documents, will determine whether South Africa can recover its industrial capability. The AU’s 2015 mandate remains on record, but confidence must be earned through delivery. If South Africa implements a credible production programme and restores energy and security stability, it can re-enter the continental market within five years.

The alternative is continued decline and loss of influence. Industrial leadership is measured by output, not declarations. The AU’s trust was never symbolic; it was contingent on performance. Ten years later, the question is whether South Africa can convert institutional memory into industrial action.

The answer lies not in new mandates but in measurable outcomes: trains produced, lines rehabilitated and factories operating at full capacity. The future of South Africa’s industrial credibility depends on it.

Nomvula Mabuza.

Image: Supplied

Nomvula Zeldah Mabuza is a Risk Governance and Compliance Specialist with extensive experience in strategic risk and industrial operations. She holds a Diploma in Business Management (Accounting) from Brunel University, UK, and is an MBA candidate at Henley Business School, South Africa.

*** The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of Independent Media or IOL.

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